Capital market inefficiencies, credit rationing and lending relationship in SME's by Cardone Riportella, Clara et al.
Working Paper 98-27 Departamento de Economía de la Empresa 
Business Economics Series 02 UIÚversidad Carlos III de Madrid 
February 1998 CI Madrid, 126 
28903 Getafe (Spain) 
Fax (341) 624-9608 
CAPITAL MARKET INEFFICIENCIES, CREDIT RATIONING AND
 
LENDING RELATIONSHIP IN SME's
 
Clara Cardone· ; Iñaki R. Longarela· and David Camino·
 
Abstract _ 
The financing of small-medium enterprises (SME' s) shows a great dependence on short term 
borrowing from banking institutions and savings banks. The causes of this situation are basically 
due to low credit availability at the stage of the firm' s life cycle when it requires the greatest 
access. A seminal paper by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) has served as the basis for 
important subsequent research. In Spain conclusions drawn by studies in this area mostly agree that 
the basic reason for the aboye mentioned low credit availability is high borrowing costs due lO 
market imperfections which inevitably lead to credit ratioIÚng. 
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, to study the roles of firm-creditor relationships (Berger and 
Udell, 1992,1995; Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995) and Loan Guarantee Associations [LGA] in 
reducing information asymmetries in loan contracts and, second, to attempt to ascertain whether 
these factors are among the determining factors of loan rates for SME's. 
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"CAPITAL MARKET INEFFICIENCIES, CREDlT RATIONING AND 
LENDING RELATIClNSHIP IN SME's" 
The financial structure of small and medium sized enterprises ¡SME' sI is highly dependent on short term financing 
from banking institutions and savings banks. This situation is mainly due to the difficulty they have in gaining access 
to the credit market during the period in which they need it mosto The credit market plays an important role during the 
first months of a business' existence, but the information asymmetries which are an inherent defect of the credit 
markets, makes it difficult for SME' sto gain competitive access. Unbalanced and biased information inevitably leads to 
credit rationing, the effect of which is to keep even those businesses willing to pay higher interest rates from receiving 
financing (Freixas, 1991). The problems arising in the contractual relationship between financial institutions and 
borrowers are due mainly to problems of agency, which are more marked in the case of SME' s. According to the 
agency theory (Jensen y Meckling, 19761 in lending relationships, the agent is the owner·director of the business, while 
the provider of resources is the principal. 
The existence of information asymmetries in all types of contractual relationships leads to ex·ante or adverse 
selectíon, and to ex-post or moral hazard effects IStiglitz and Weiss, 1981). The adverse selection effect refers to the 
increased rísk assumed by borrowers whenever they are willing to accept ·or promise to pay . higher interest rates in 
order to take on high·risk projects. This is when the lender tends to only issue credit to those businesses falling within 
acceptable risk levels. At the same time, moral hazard risk líes with the borrower, and depends on their opportunistic 
behaviour since the borrower takes actions which the lender is unaware of, or only slightly aware of, which can affect 
the investments financed. 
This paper is structured as follows: after the introduction and an overview of the relevant literature, section two 
presents the main findings of an empirical study among SME's conducted between September 1996 and May 1997. In 
section three the borrower·lender relationship is analyzed, and section four examines the determining factors of 
businesses' cost of debt, in accordance with their business, experience, size, sector, financial structure and the 
existence of cross·collateral guarantees. Section five contains a summary of the main findings and possible areas of 
study for future research. 
1.- Previous Research 
Price or quantity credit rationing 1 can be said to exist when the expected profitability of the investment projects 
presented by borrowers cannot be appreciated by lenders, due to which these leads to interest rates with different risk 
premium levels. These interest rates may have double implications IJaffee and Russell, 1976; Jaffee and Modigliani, 
1979; Freixas, 1991). (i) Through these we can observe the ex-ante or adverse selection effects, as businesses willing 
to assume greater risks also perceive a low probability of loan repayment and will also be those most willing to accept 
higher interest rates. (ji) The ex·post or moral hazard effects can be equally observed here inasmuch as the market, by 
iaising interest rates, induces businesses to take on projects with little or no probability of success, but which, if they 
are successful, will bring major benefits for companies which in no case will be shared with the lender (Caminal, 1995)2. 
What, then, do lenders do? Once the optimum interest rate is reached -this being the price aboye which lenders might 
see a drop in profitability, despite excess demando and, having rationed prices, they will begin to reduce available credit 
and channel resources toward the better qualified borrowers. Also, in the case of investment projects offering different 
profitability levels from those expected, lenders will prefer to channel their resources to financing for those projects 
which offer lower risk levels, larger in scale and that take place over a longer period of time IMilgrom and Roberts, 
1982). In the case of projects offering the same profitability levels, the availability of outside funding will depend on the 
borrower' s economic and financial situation (self financingl and equity (the possibility of the borrower supplying 
collateral guaranteesl (Calomiris and Hubbard, 19881. Finally, although investment project financing is partially 
conditioned by the size of the lending institution itself (Peek and Rosengren, 1995a, 1995b13, we feel that there is no 
banking institution which would be unable to assume SME financing due to problems of size. Therefore, rather than the 
size of the lending institution, here it would be make more sense to speak of regulating solvency and limiting risk by 
sectors. 
From a business standpoint, the size, the financial structure (Fazzari and Athey, 1987 and Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen, 19881 and experience of the borrowers are important factors when entering the credit market. If the 
characteristics of the debt holders are also taken into account, the following stand out among the ways to reduce the 
information imbalance which leads to credit rationing: (1) participation in capital by the financial entity providing 
funding, and, also, (iD the improvement and consolidation of the lender·borrower relationship, since credit institutions 
1•• This rationing is discriminatory, since only sorne applicants obrtain financing. However, when financial institutions give financing to all applicants 
in amounts lower than that requested, it is known as homogeneous rationing. 
2•• In the case of Spain, there might al so be sorne opportunistic ex·ante behaivour, since projects financed are guaranteed investments, but provide 
low profitability. 
3._ Thus, large credit institutions make no great efforts to analyze, supervise or monitor projects which mean only marginal or low profitability. 
2 
can themselves generate information on the borrower (Fama, 1985 and Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor, 1986). Thus, 
both interest rates and the collateral guarantees required are expected to decline as the relationship is consolidated and 
matures. Recurrent Iiterature has been published on the sUbject, most notably the work of Berger and Udell11992 and 
1995) and that of Petersen and Rajan 11994 and 1995) which underscore that the "value,A of the borrower·lender 
relationship consolidates ovar time since the information possessed by both parties reduces the information 
asymmetries, while its "strength" reduces the effects of credit rationin{ It is to be expected that the longer the 
relationship is between the parties, the following situations will arise: (1) greater credit availability, not always 
accompanied by a drop in interest rates. The effects of the credit relationship depend on market characteristics. 
According to Petersen and Rajan (19951 competition and long term credit relationships are not always compatiblllf 
the credit market is concentrated, the financial intermediaries will be more willing to compensate interest rates 
throughout a business' lifetime by, initially applying lower rates than those offered in competitive markets. Whereas, in 
a more competitive market scenario. lending institutions charge high interest rates at the begining due to the low 
probability that the credit relationship will be extended and consolidated, and benefits expected in the future shared, 
This partially explains why younger businesses prefer self·financing ovar institutional financing, since in highly 
competitive, low concentrated credit markets, the former is cheaper than the latter [Rajan and Petersen, 19951. iD A 
drop in the collateral guarantees required by lenders (Boot and Thakor, 1994; Diamond, 19911. 
In Spain, academic interest in the effect of the businesses size on capital structures and firms's financing costs has 
generated a great de al of research (Cardone, 19971. In sorne cases, the validity of these studies has been questioned 
due to a lack of statistical information and representativity of the sample7, The studies conducted by Mato (1988, 
1989 and 19901 de al mainly with the relationships between the level of equity, cost of capital, financial structure of 
SME's and employment levels. Between 1983 and 1988 Hernando and Vallés (19921 analyzed the financial structures 
and the differentiated financial performance of 1,070 industrial manufacturing companies of the CBBE (excluding the 
4,. Wilh respecl lo credil renewal, evidence has been found in lhe American markel lhal il generales grealer non·recurring profils lhan lhe 
announcemenl of a new credil aUlhorizalion. González Méndez 119971 has recently confirmed lhal in lhe Spanish markel as welllhere is evidence of 
the exislence of major increases in share prices on dales close lo lhal upon which bank financing is approved and lhal of lhe issue of shares 
subscribed by financial inslilulions. Agrealer reaclion on lhe slock markel prior lo bank loan renewal over lhal of new loan concession has also 
been confirmed in lhis same markel. 
S" The dala base used by lhese aulhors is made of lhe 3,404 companies in lhe Nalional Survey of Small Business Finance INSSBFI. a member of lhe 
U.S. Small Business Adminislralion, These are companies wilh less lhan 500 employees and an average of 10 years in lhe markelplace. 
6•• Commenls on lhe credil markel are equally applicable lo lhe job markel. where grealer compelilion means grearer incenlive for lhe employer lo 
inform and Ira in personnel, given lhe increased possibilily lhallhey be lured away by lhe compelilion. [Rajan and Pelersen, 1995]. 
7•• Among lhe main dala bases being used, we find lhe 'Cenlral de Balances del Banco España ICBBEl. lhe Induslrial Survey of Business Slralegies 
and, lhe dala base of lhe Inslilule of Financial Sludies. 
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energy sector). The influence of size and financial structure in the investment decisions confirms that businesses' 
investment levels do not depend solely on the profits expected from their projects, but rather on internal resources and 
on the level of debt ·which also affect the access of SME to bank loans·. Self financing is important since smaller 
businesses are subject to credit rationing, both in price and quanlity. This was an inter·temporal study. 
Ocaña, Salas y Vallés 119941 analyze the variables upon which financing depends as well as the significant 
differences among these based on size. For these authors, the average cost of debt for small businesses is lower than 
or equal to the average cost for their larger counterparts, without taking into account the resources employed for debt 
guarantees. When effective costs are taken into account the relationship observed is the following: the smaller the 
business, the higher the cost of borrowing. The sample used for this case carne from 670 CBBE businesses' responses 
between 1983·1988. Maroto (1996) conducted a financial study of SME' s for the 1990 . 1995 period, in which it was 
once again shown that certain structural patterns are still used in financing these businesses, to whit: lil limited 
capacity to assume medium and long·term debt; (ii) high risk premiums paid and, ¡¡ii) the extreme dependency on short 
term bank financing, on commercial credit and on own resources. The data base used in this case was also that of 
CBBE. Finally, Caminal 11 995) analyzed the potential role of public policy in SME financing from the standpoint of 
economic efficiency. 
The "age" of business, as well as the "experience" of the borrower·lender relationships and the mediation of the Loan 
and Guarantee Associations lLGA]8, might, in sorne cases, improve and expand upon the information available to the 
lender, and thus reduce the asymmetries of information which are to be found in any lending contract. For this reason, 
this paper has a double purpose., (Il to study the importance of the lender·borrower relationships and that of the LGAs 
role, as factors contributing to the reduction of the information asymmetries present in any loan contract, and, (ii) to 
analize whether these factors are among the main determinants of SME ¡nterest rates. 
2.· Data 
In Spain, close to 40,200 SME' s make use of the mutual guarantee system to gain access to the credit market 
(Cardone, 1995), due to which the businesses considered in this study are among those which meet two conditions: (il 
8" Aeeording to Royal Deeree 1885178, Loan Guarantee Assoeiations are financial intermediaries whose main purpose is to ofler eollateral signature 
on loans to eligible members. 
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that of being a micro lbetween 1·10 employeesl, to medium sized business (from 50 to 250 employeesl9 and (iil are 
either currently making use of the guarantee of an lGA or have done so in the past10, 
a.' Population: The original population studied was the 40,171 participating members of the 18 lGA •s active in Spain 
by October 1996. Since only 9 lGAS from 8 Autonomous Communities", participated in the study, the original figure 
was reduced to a "theoretical" population of 18,940 companies. Of this number, 4,636 companies were selected and 
surveyed between January and May of 1997. If 100% of the companies in the sample had responded, the guaranteed 
margin of error would have been 1.4%.12 However, given that the response level was only 4.1 %. 83.8% did not 
respond and the Post OHíce returned the remaining 12.1 %of questionnaires sent out· the margin of error was 26% 13. 
9._ According to EUROSTAT, companies with lewer than 249 employees are consdered to be SMEs, whole micro companies are those with Oto 9 
employees; small companies ha ve betwen 10 and 49 employees and medium size companies between 50 and 249. Spanish Law 1/94 delines SMEs 
as those companies with lewer than 250 employees. 
10._ Not all eligible LGA member companies ha ve requested loan guarantees. 
11 •• Andalusia, Asturias, Balearic Islands, Castilla-Leon, Regíon 01 Valencia, Galicia, Madrid and Murcia. 
12._ Which can be calculated using the lollowing formula: 
With:
 
n - Sample size. (4,636).
 
z ~ Value 01 1.96 lor a level 01 signilicance 01 95%.
 
O= Level 01 accuracy or error.
 
p - Percentage 01 population to be estimated.
 
13 •• This error is determined based on the lollowing lormula: 
Where: 
N ~ Population: 
n = Sample. 
k ~ 1.96 lor a level 01 signilicance 01 95%. 
p - Percentage 01 the population to be estimated. 
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A 35 question questionnaire divided in three sections was devised. The first of these dealt with basic business 
profile aspects of SME' s; the second referred to aspects relating to the lender·borrower relationship, and the third 
block dealt with subjects relating to the guarantees14. 
In December, a pretest was conducted for which a questionnaire was sent to 39 businesses located throughout Spain. 
After sorne corrections, the questionnaire was mailed out to the remaining firms in January of 1997, with an attached 
letter explaining the purpose of the study and a self-addressed stamped envelope to facilitate participant response. Of 
those, 190 businesses which responded to the questionnaire, one was excluded from the study when it was learned the 
company had over 250 employees. 
The information supplied by the lGA' s was organized in a variety of forms, despite the request that data on 
companies with current and non-current financial guarantees be kept separate. Thus, sorne firms only supplied 
information for one group of participating members; other lGA .s provided one sole file with information on all their 
oarticipating members; while still others presented the information separately as requested, that is organized by 
companies with both current and non-current loans guaranteed by lGA .s. Of the 18915 valid responses received, 12 
companies had no collateral guarantees; 55 companies had a valid guarantee at the time of response; 2 had never 
requested a guarantee, while the remaining 120 companies could not be identified. 
b.· Demographic analysis of the sample. The variables used to define the business profile are: the business' main 
activity sector (SAPI16; the legal form under which the business is organized (FOJI; capital ownership (PROI of the 
business; whether the business is managed by the owners themselves or by third parties (OIR) and finally, by size, 
measured by two different parameters: number of employees (TAM1) and sales turnover [TAM2J 17. 
The profile of the companies responding to the questionnaire is as follows: The SME' s of up to 30 years old belong 
mainly to the service sector and are organized as limited Companies; they are the property of one prívate individual·· 
14 •• The questionnaire was evaluated by colleagues specialized in Accounting and Finance within the Business Economics Department at Carlos 111 
University in Madrid, as well as colleagues in the area 01 Human Resources at the same university. It lurther benelited Irom the comments 01 
Manuel Ortega at the Bank 01 Spain 's Commercial Perlormance Inlormation Bureau. 
15._ Which does not imply that all analyses have 189 observations (i.e. in Chart 1, is sorne cases there are only 183 observationsl. 
16•• The sectors used in the questionnaire are: Primary, Industry, Retail Sales, Wholesale Sales, Construction, Services, Misc. 
\7 •• Sales turnover lor SME' s were divided into the lollowing percentiles: 0·30,000; 30,001·106,000; 106,001·313,389 and over 313,389 
thousand pesetas. 
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meaning that there are no investors from other businesses or groups of businesses-, and are managed mainly by their 
owners, The majority are micro-enterprises. 
The companies over 30 years old belong mainly to the secondary or industrial sector; they are organized as Joint 
Stock Companies and are the property of private individuals. They are managed by their owners and are mainly small 
enterprises. 
Tabla O 
C. Main activity sector: size and age of husinesses. The questionnaire included four parameters for measuring business 
size. The first -on which most of the studies on SME financing were based is the number of employees [TAM 1]. When 
referring companies in the service sector, the piece of data which best measures size is sales volume [TAM2]. If the 
study is also dealing with the guarantees offered upon applying for loans, variables such as the total net assets after 
allowing for depreciation [TAM4] are included to measure the size of businesses. These two variables were also 
included since they were considered relevant by the businessmen to whom the questionnaire was administered 
personally. 
With respect to age, businesses were asked to indicate how many years had passed since the initiation of their main 
activity [EDAD 1] and the number of years since the business was acquired by the current owner [EDAD2J. The interest 
in this last piece of data is due to the fact that managers of SME' s are usually the persons who de al with the credit 
entities with whom they negotiate commercial transactions. Aside from the number of years since the business started 
their main activity, when analyzing the importance of the lender-borrower relationship, the time the current 
management has been with the business can be much more relevant. 
Using ANOVA and taking the main activity sector into account as a factor, it was compared with the variables 
defined in the two paragraphs (above), so as to determine which would be used for future analyses. After the 
corresponding analyses were conducted, it was seen that the average size as measured by sales volume was the 
variable offering greater differences among the different sectors dealt with in the survey. The remaining variables 
mentioned above were fairly constant, as can be seen by the Fvalues in Table 1. 
Tabla 1 
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d.. Sources 01 Financing: The behavior of the sources of short term financing used by the SME' s surveyed are as 
follows: as the number of employees increased [TAM 1] and the time trancurred since the SME began working in the 
main activity, [EDAD 11, financing by suppliers [Fl1 and bank financing lfrom both domestic and foreign banks) ¡ncrease 
significantly [F2 y F41. Financing from Savings Banks [F61 is more prevalent in smaller and younger companies It is 
domestic banks which provide most long term financing [F3] when businesses ¡¡re smaller and younger, while long term 
financing from Savings Banks [F71 as the number of employees drops and time since main activity was initiated 
considerably ¡ncreases. 
Table 2 
Given the F values, we should point out that among the different groups by size and age in general, the differences 
between the average values for each type of financing do not vary significantly. 
This study suggests the comparison of the following hypotheses concerning the contractual relationship and 
guarantees in SME financing processes: 
(1) Length of the firm·creditor relationship 
Hl: If the length of the lending relationship with the main credit institution is greater than the length with the second 
most important credit institution, concentration of the credit market may follow and hence, the greater "fidelity" the 
greater credit availability. 
H2: If the length of the lending relationship with the main credit institution is lesser than the length with the second 
most important credit institution, one may guess that the credit market is competitive, and therefore, access to credit 
from new lenders is easier. 
(¡iJ Number of financial institutions from which the firm borrows and biggest percentage coming from a single financial 
institution. 
H3: The greater the firm's size and its age, the greater the number of financial institutions and hence, credit availability. 
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H4: The greater the firm's size and its age, the lesser the percentage coming from a single financial institution. 
(¡ii] Concentration/diversification of nonborrowing financial operations. 
H5.1: Non·borrowing relationships with the main credit institutions are better valued the greater the firm's size. 
H5.2: The greater the firm's size the lesser concentrated are financial operations in one single institution. 
kv) Demanded guarantees by the creditor. 
H6: The guarantee·loan ratio, the quantity and quality of demanded guarantees depend on the firm's size and its age. 
(vJ Cost of borrowing. 
H7: The length of the firm-creditor relationship improves credit availability, but does not reduce its cost. 
H8: Making use of LGA guarantees improves credit availability, but it does not reduce cost. 
3.- Measurement of the borrower ·(ender relationship 
Petersen and Rajan (19941 use the following observable dimensions to facilitate evaluation of the borrower·lender 
relationship: [il the length of the borrower·lender relationship; (ii) the number of financial institutions the business works 
with, along with the concentration of loans with one sole lender and, (iji) the services received from one sole financial 
entity. Since one of the purposes of this study is to better understand the effect of the mediation of LGA .s in the 
credit negotiation process, ·mainly as relates to the cost of borrowing and credit availability· a fourth dimension has 
been added (iv) guarantees required by lenders for loan authorization. 
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(I}length of relationship with prime or main credit institutions. By prime we mean those entities lending the largest 
percentage of all third party funds. If the length of the lending relationship -measured in years- of the borrower with his 
prime credit institution lAR 1] is greater than the length of his relationship with its second most important credit 
institution [AR2], this would reflect a characteristic of the concentrated credit market -a characteristic which is 
necessary but insufficient-. When the main credit institution is also that with which the borrower has had the longest 
relationship, this would confirm the fact that firm do not change borrowing financial institutions easily -they are more 
loyal· and the longer standing the relationship is between borrower and lender, the more logical it is to assume that 
credit availabílity, in exchange for this loyalty, is also greater. 
If, on the contrary, the longevity of the relationship with the main credit institution [AR1] is less than the longevity of 
the relationship with the second most important credit institution [AR2], it can be deduced that the market is more 
competitive and less concentrated, and therefore that more financing from other financial institutions is available to 
businesses, even in the case of newer relationships, meaning that the financial institution with which the longest 
relationship has been maintained is not the one from which the most credit is available. 
The results obtained based on the number of employees [TA1V111 show that medium sized companies have longer 
relationships with the first credit institution than small ones, which in turn have longer relationships than the micro 
businesses. Due to the above, it can be said that the older the business, the larger it tends to be and the more stable 
the relationship, although it should also be said that this could well be due to the fact that larger businesses tend also 
to be the older ones and therefore are in a position to maintain a longer·lasting relationship. When the longevity of the 
business in its main activity [EDAD 11 is crossed with the length of its relationship with the financial institution, it can be 
seen that for SME .s over five years of age, and those between 6 and 15 years of age, their relationship with the bank 
is older than the business itself, which can be understood to mean that the relationship began prior to the business' 
initiation in the main activity. 
This relationship can be clearly seen when the age from which the main activity [EDAD1] began is crossed with the 
variable [AR 1] which represents the longevity of the relationship with the prime credit entity, whose chi square has a 
value of 56.099, which denotes a strong relationship between both variables. Something similar occurs when we cross 
the (EDADI variable, meaning the time under current ownership, where the chi square is 54.694, as is to be expected, 
given the similarity between EDAD 1 and EDAD. 
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If the longevity of the relationship with the second most important entity [AR2], is considered, we see that for older, 
medium size businesses, the relationship maintained with the primary and secondary financial entities tend to even out. 
Thus, the relationship maintained by 50% of the businesses of over 30 years of age and 62% of the medium size 
businesses with their top two financial entities tend to have the same durations. 
Table 3 
The findings in Table 3 show that at first, Spanish businesses tend to maintain loyal relationships with their credit 
entities, since the age of the business tends to coincide with the longevity of the relationship. 
(Ji] The number of financial entities [EFI that the SME' s work with and the maximum percentage of debt [DMX] 
requested from one sole entity reveal an important aspect of the borrower·lender relationship, inasmuch as it tells us 
how much businesses diversify when applying for credit. Here it can be seen that as the number of employees [TAM1], 
sales volume [TAM2] and number of years since the business initiated its main activity increase, [EDAD1], so do the 
number of financial entities with which the SME' s do business. At the same time, the maximum percentage of debt 
obtained from one sole financial entity [DMX] starts to drop off. This does not necessarily mean that business relations 
are not maintained wíth the first financial entities. 
Companies reported workíng with a minimum of one financial entity, regardless of the number of employees [TAM 1], 
their sales volume [T AM2], or the number of years they have operated in the main activity [EDAD 1], and a maximum of 
ten financial entities were reported for the smallest and youngest companies and up to fourteen financial entities for 
medium size businesses and those with over 30 years of operations in the main activity. At the same time, the highest 
average percentages of maximum debt maintained with a financial entity [DMX] are those corresponding to the 
smallest companies (62.3% with an average deviation of 32.7) and the youngest companies /54.8%, with an average 
deviation of 30.91. 
In this case the values of the f·statistic leave no room for doubt. For the case of medium size SME' s measured by the 
number of employees [TAM1], the values for both the number of financial entities [EF] and the percentage of maximum 
debt held with one sole entity [DMX] differ greatly. However, when businesses are considered by sales volume [TAM2] 
and by the years since initiating the main activity [EDAD 1], clear differences can be seen for the financial entities, 
although not for the maximum debt maintained with one sole financial entity. 
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Table 4 
Therefore, as the size increases and as SME' s get older, the market has more information, which leads them to 
diversify their operations, and thus to decrease the percentage of debt maintained with one sole credit entity. 
I~iil Services from one sole financial entity. In addition to the quantitative data on the length of the borrower·lender 
relationship, it is also important to consider the value the companies place on their business relationships with credit 
entities, including other financial services entities, all of which serve to expand upon the information which the lender 
has on the borrower. This is the case of current accounts, savings accounts, deposits for employees, payroll, etc. In 
order to discern the concentration of financial activities, it is also important to consider whether businesses "always" 
work with the same financial entity for a given type of transaction, ·discount of documents, credit lines, credits with a 
mortgage security, etc.' to find out how concentrated financial activities are. 
As shown in table 5.1 on a scale of Oto 5 (with zero being the lowest value and 5 the highest), the figures barely 
reach 3, with 3.11 being the highest score. This can be interpreted to mean that in the mid·term, businesses consider 
commercial relationships maintained with the main financial entity to be of no, little or some importance. The level of 
Importance assigned rises as the size of the business increases. At the same time, they place more value on the 
relationship maintained with entity 1 (the most important financial entity) than those maintained with entity 2 lthe 
second most important financial entity). 
With respect to the concentration of certain transactions with one sole financial entity, the results are more or less 
uniformo He percentages of concentration drop along with size. One noteworthy tendency observed is that medium 
size businesses have a higher percentage of concentration ··well above that of the micro and small companies·· in 
mortgage transactions. 
When the analysis is done considering the years since the business initiated in the main activity [EDAD 1J, the results 
obtained are less clear. The majority of younger businesses along with the older businesses, assign a greater value to 
the importance of the relationship, and once again the most important relationship is with the prime financial entity. 
With respect to the concentration of operations with one sole financial entity, the lowest percentages once again 
correspond to the two ends of the scope: businesses of less than 5 and more than 30 years of age. 
Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.2. 
(iv) Guarantees required by the lender. Finally, another measurement of the importance assigned to the relationship 
lender·borrower is that of the guarantees required by financial entities. In this case, we attempted to measure the 
borrowers' perception of the reasons for the guarantees required by the lenders, the type of guarantees required and 
their relationship with the loan applied foro 
It is to be expected that the reasons collateral guarantees are required [CA and CAlII; the type of guarantee 
requested [TI and TIP] and the relationship between the guarantee/loan requested [GPI differ by size, age of the 
~usiness, the length of the lender·borrower relationship and whether or not an lGA is involved. The analysis is done 
based on the number of employees [TAM1]; sales volume [TAM2], and years since the SME initiated in the main activity 
[EDAD 11 and whether or not there is an lGA collateral guarantee. 
With respect to the reasans behind the lender' s request for a guarantee [chart 6.1 J. the micro businesses (3.481, and 
small 13.67) and medium size businesses 13,29) feel that "the amount of the loan" is important and almost very 
important. For micro businesses (1.57) and small businesses, (1.67) "the length of the relationship between the lender 
and borrower" is considered of little or some importance. For medium size businesses, the "project feasibility" 11.76) is 
considered more important than the "the length of the lender ·borrower relationship" (1.00). Micro and small 
businesses feel that project feasibility (1.51) is considered less important than the amount of the loan applied for or the 
lender·borrower relationship. When analyzed by the companies' sales volume TAIIJI21, for the first three business 
groups, "the length of the relationship between the lender and borrower" was considered of little and some importance 
11.26; 1.94 and 1.94), but in any case, of lesser importance than "the amount of the loan" and "project feasibility". 
When considering the years the business has been in the main activity [EDAD 1], it was confirmed that firms under 30 
years of age considered the "the length of the relationship between the lender and borrower" to be of Httle or some 
importance (1.64; 1.72 and 1.081, but in any case, always less important than "the amount of the loan" and "project 
viability". 
As for the type al guarantees required by the lender, all businesses responding in the sample ·regardless of size and 
age· agreed that the most frequently requested guarantees are "personal and not related to the business activity" 
followed by an lGA guarantee (except in the case of older firms between 16 and 30 years of age). 
With respect to the guarantee·loan requested, the results are somewhat contradictory, since it was to be expected 
that for younger and smaller businesses, this proportion would be higher than for older and larger companies. 
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Table 6.1. 
The same analysis was done but this time taking into account whether or not an LGA guarantee had been issued at 
the time of response to the survey [chart 6.2.1 AII firms, with or without financial guarantee, agreed that banking 
entities sistematically do not approve a credit if no guarantees are supplied. When the firm has a guarantee, this 
depends mainly on "the amount of the loan", followed by the "project viability" for which financing is sought, and 
finally on the "the length of the relationship between the lender and borrower". While in cases where the business does 
not have a collateral 9uarantee, "the length of the relationship between the lender and borrower" moves down to 
fourth place in importance. With respect to the type of guarantees requested, both groups agree that the type most 
frequently requested is personal, and unrelated with the business activity for which it is sought. Both groups assigned 
a medium value [0.3 and 0.4) to the importance of LGA mediation. 
Finally. for a third of those surveyed. the non·supply of guarantees implied an average increase of 5.91 percentage 
points in the cost of the collateral guarantee. For the remainder this ¡ncrease did not existo Can this response be 
interpreted as meaning that what does exist is merely the non·avaifability of credit? This option was not openly offered 
in the survey, but was added on by the respondents in 8.9% of the cases of groups with a guarantee and by 4.5% of 
the group not identified by the LGA. 
Table 6.2. 
4.· Analysis of the firm's cost of debt 
In this section we focus on our second goal which is to determine the variables that affect the small·medium enterprises' cost 
of debt by implementing a regression analysis. Our data set ineludes 78 observations and as a proxy for the dependent variable 
we have chosen the nominal interest rate that the SME's state to endure in their short term operations [NCp].18 The sample 
mean of this variable is 8.96% with a standard deviation of 2.11. This figure exceeds 3.4% the average value of the three· 
month MIBOR during the first semester of 1997 ·all surveys were received in this period·. Our model has been estimated by OLS 
and obeys the following linear specification: 
18 Firms were asked to indicate nominal and real interest loan rates in their most recent credit operatíon together with charged 
comissions. Few answers to these questions were collected and this fact forced us to use the nominal cost as representative of the 
cost of debt with a small sample of 78 observations. 
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NCP = /30+/31D3+ /3::D4+ /3JD5 + /34 D6 + /3j DFELL + /36 DSGR+ 
+/37 DDP+/38 LVT+/39 LED+/310RA + 8 
where 03, 04, 05 and 06 are dummy variables corresponding to those firms whose main activity falls into the sectors: 
retail business, wholesale business, construction and services, respectively -the industrial sector works as a basis and 
the small number of observations corresponding to the primary sector and others has been removed-o The survey's 
arrival date [[IFELI.l takes value one when dealing with a poli received before 03131197 and zero otherwise. OSGR is 
also a dummy variable and it takes value one if the loan is guaranteed by aLGA and zero otherwise and similarly, [I[1P 
has unit value when the firm pays late its trade credits and zero otherwise. The log value of sales volume [LVT] proxies 
the firm's size, while LEO represents the number of years since the beginning of the firm's main activity, also in log 
terms. Finally, the firm's financial structure enters the model through the variable RA which stands for the percentage 
value of the firm's debt with respect to its totalliabilities. The low response level in certain Autonomous Communities 
did not allow us to ínelude any reference to the geographicallocation of the firmo 
Before analyzing our results, a few aspects deserve some comments. The aim of the variable [IFELL is twofold. On one 
hand, it is required in order to achieve a correct model specification -the survey was implemented during a períod of 
seríous reductions of the interest rates and on the other hand, it allows for measurement, always with caution, of the 
effect of this reduction on the firm's loan costo The absence of variables representing the role of relationships with the 
banking institutions has also some explanation. Prelíminary analysís of the effect of the length of the relationship with 
íts current lender and the number of banks from which the firm borrows has led us to conclude that both variables 
seem írrelevant in order to determine the loan costo In both cases, their significance was tested after the corresponding 
multicolinearity analysis. In this sense, our results are similar to Petersen and Rajan 11994). We have excluded these 
variable from the model because of our small sample which forces us to include a limited number of regressors. 
Our regression results are given ín Table 7. A fair part of the variation of NCP is explained by the firm characteristics. 
The coefficient estimates for the firm characteristics are consistent with these variables beíng proxies for the risk. 
Larger firms pay lower interest rates, younger firms bear higher costs and a higher leverage leads to lower interest 
rates. 19 
From a statistical point of view, the existence of collateral guarantees offered by LGA's does not have a significant 
impact on the dependent variable. Even though, the correspondíng coefficient estímate is negative, we fínd no evidence 
19 We havo sacrificad a direct interpretation of the coefficient estimates tar the firm's sizo and ag9 that the absenca 01 a log transformation 
would permil, in arder lo avoid problems wilh lhe subsequenl heleroskedaslicily. Furlhermore, il is consislenl wilh lhe empirical evidence (Pelersen 
and Rajan, 19941 a declining marginal impacl 01 bolh variables. 
--------------;----------------­
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to reject the hypothesis of their effect being null. It should be noted that these collaterals could be important in terms 
of credit availability, having no explanatory power over the cost of debt. 
With respect to the impact of the declining interest rates, the coefficient estimate for DFElllet us assert that during 
the period under study a significant reduction on the short term cost of debt took place. Our point estimate sets this 
20decrement to 1%. On the other hand, those firms paying their credits late have to put up with higher loan rates.
Finally, according to our results, firms grouped into the retail and wholesale business bear larger costs than those ¡nto 
the services sector. 
Table 7 
5.- Summary and concluding remarks 
The main conclusions which may be drawnfrom the study arease follows: 
(i) The importance of the lender-borrower relationship was measured based on four observable dimensions designed to 
reflect the covariance of the relationship. The following results were obtained: 
- With respect to "the length of the relationship with the main credit entities" the results obtained based on SME size, 
measured by the number of employees [TAM1], it was seen that medium sized businesses have a longer relationship with 
the first financial entity than the smaller ones, which in turn ha ve longer standing relationships than the micro businesse. 
Therfore, it can be said that the larger thefirms, the more stable the relationship, although we should point out that this 
may be due to the fact that larger firm are also the oldest and therefore are those which are in a position to have a more 
long-standing relationship. This relationship is evidenced when the age of the firm by the number of years since its 
initiation in the main activity [EDAD 1] is validated with the variablewith the number of years of the SME' s relationship 
20 ._ This linding may question the traditional specilication 01 the cost 01 debt by means 01 univariate regression models, as DDP could be an 
endagenaus variable, especialfy il we cansider it a praxy lar credit availability. 
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with the main or prime financial entity [AR 1] whose chi square represents a value of 56.099, thus denoting a strong 
relationship between the two variables. 
If we consider the variable length of relationship with the second most important financial entity [AR2], we see that 
80% of the companies show a relationship with the first entity which is either greater than or equal to the relationship 
with the second most important entity. For medium size and older firm, the relationship with the prime and secondary 
entity tend to even out. Thus, 50% of the companies over 30 years of age and 62% of the medium size firm have a 
relationship of eq ual duration with their top two financial entities. 
- With respect to the number of financia! entities with which a firm operates, [EFJ and the highest percentage of debt 
requested from only one of these entities [DMX], it can be seen that as the average size by number of employees [TAM 11 
and the size by sales volume [TAM2J and age, measured in years since the initial activity increase [EDAD1], the number of 
financial entities with which they do business also increases, in parallel with a decrease in the maximum percentage of 
debt held with one sole entity. As for the number of financial entities with which businesses do business, all responded 
with a mínimum of 1, regardless of the size ·number of employees [TAM 1J, sales volume [T AM2J, and age, measured in 
years since the begining of the main activity [EDAD 11, and a maximum of 10 financia1 entities for the smallest and 
youngest and of 14 financial entities for medium sized firm and those over 30 years of age. The smallest and youngest 
businesses showed the largest average percentages of maximum debt with one financial entity [DMXI 162.3% with an 
dverage deviation of 32.7% and 54.8% with a deviation of 30.9%), respectively. 
. Under the heading of services received from one so!e financia! entity, the companies rated the business relationships 
maintained with the main financial entity as unimportant, of little importance or of sorne importance. The ratings rose in 
accordance with the size of the businesses responding. They also valued business relationships maintained with entity 
number 1 (the prime financial institutionl more than those maintained with entity 2 !the second most important financial 
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entityl. With respect to the concentration of certain operations with one sole financial entity, the results were more or 
less uniform: the percentages of concentration are gradually reduced as size decreases. One exception is the particularly 
high percentage of concentration reported by medium size firm ·well above that of micro and small businesses· in 
mortgage operations. When the analysis is done based on how long it has been since the business initiated in the main 
activity, [EDAD 11, results are less c1ear. Nearly all the youngest and oldest businesses place more value on the 
importance of the relationship with the prime financial entity. Under the concentration of operations with one sole 
financial entity, the lowest percentages are once again found on either end of the scale: businesses under 50r over 30 
years of age. 
. Under the category of guarantees required by the lender, the companies analyzed by size ·measured by the number of 
employees and volume of operations [TAM 1. TAM21 . and depending on how long the firm hasbeen working in the main 
activity[EDAD1Jand whether or not they have an LGA guarantee· feel that these depend more on the amount of the loan 
applied for and on project feasibility than on the length of the lender·borrower relationship. As for the guarantees 
requested, the majority are personal, and unrelated to the business activity, followed by LGA guarantees. Athird of the 
respondents thought that if no guarantee were supplied. it meant an increase of an average of 5.91 points in the cost of 
the collateral guarantee. For the remaining two thirds, this increase did not existo This can be interpreted simply to mean 
that what does exist is a non-availability of credit, although this question was not asked explicitly. 
In keeping with the main aspects of the primary goal of this study, here it should be said that while firm valued the 
lender·borrower relationship, inasmuch as they maintain strong ties with those credit entities with which they had their 
first contact ·even though they may work with several financial entities·, they feel that for financial entities the length of 
¡he lender·borrower relationship is not a prime factor when authorizing a loan. Similarly, as suspected, the mediation of 
an LGA is being used as a means to credit availability. 
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(i¡} With regard to the cost of debt, we can conclude that a sizeable part of variations in short term nominal interest rates 
[NCPI is explained by factors related to the characteristics of the firm s in question. The estimated rates are consistent 
with the fact that these variables are proxies of risk. Thus, the largest firm pay the lowest cost of debt; the youngest 
businesses are confronted with the highest interest rates, and the firm with lower debt levels pay lower financial 
charges. One relatively surprising fact is the negligible influence the LGA 9uarantees had on our sample from a statistical 
standpoint. Oespite the fact that the estimatíon coefficient associated with this is negative, based on the evidence 
gathered from our data, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the effect is nil. The reason may be that the guarantee is 
relevant only in terms of credit availability, but has a negligible effect on the cost of debt. 
As for the effect of the drop in interest rates, the estimated coefficient of the variable as of the date the survey was 
received leads us to conclude that in the period analyzed, there was a statistically significant reduction [OFELLl made in 
the cost of short term debt for smaller businesses; our specific estimator quantifies this decrease at the 1% level. 
Otherwise, the companies which are late in paying their suppliers are charged a clearly higher interest rate. Finally, 
judging from the results of our estimation, the smallest retail and wholesale businesses participating in the study are 
those which pay the highest interest rates, higher than those paid by companies in the service sector. 
Finally, in order to complete this study of the credit market, some other points to which this study could be extended 
are introduced (i) an analysis of the credit market from a supply standpoint. It is to be expected that the perception of 
credit entities will differ regarding the importance of the lender·borrower relationship and the mediation of LGA as 
factors for generating information and for reducing risk, respectively. (i¡} Since we already know that credit is obtained 
mainly from savings banks, it would be of interest to find out how SIVIE investments are channeled. In their dealings 
with financial entities, there may be a certain imbalance dependíng on whether operations are deposits or loan. 
Oepending upon this, it is to be expected that the investments made would be made with commercial banks (whose 
19 
eredit investment would go to large businesses), and that eredits would be taken out wíth savings banks lfinaneed by 
the deposits of private individuals·familiesl. 
20 
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Sector Main No. Employees Size by number of employees TA[M 1/ Number of Years in the main activity [EDAD1] 
Activity 
Average Minimum Meximum D.T Average Minimum Maximum D.T 
Primary 4 16 2 53 25 18 5 40 15 
Secondery 54 34 1 250 46 28 1 168 32 
Relail Bus. 22 7 1 30 8 19 2 46 14 
Wholesale Bus. 16 29 3 211 51 25 4 77 22 
Conslruction 25 42 3 174 39 21 7 45 11 
Services 58 25 1 240 47 16 2 70 14 
Olher 4 21 4 34 13 19 2 35 16 
f·stetistic: 1.6457 f·statistic: 1,6164 
p·value: 0,1372 p·value: 0,1450 
Table O: Distribution by activity sector of firms participating in the sample 
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No. DI employees [TAM11 aod maio activity sector ISAP] 
Aooual salas voluma [T AM21 and (SAPI 
Tolal net assets afler depreciation (TAM31 aod (SAP[ 
Total fixed assets afler depreciatioo(TAM41 and ISAPI 
Years since main activity ioitiated [EDADl [and ¡SAPI 
Years curren! owoer [EDAD2] aod [SAP[ 
Analysis Table1 : ANOVA 
f·statistic: 1,6457; 
F·statistic: 2,8255; 
f·statistic: 1,3552; 
f·statistic: 1,0269; 
f·statistic: 1,6164; 
f·statistic: 1.1896; 
p·value: 0,1372 
p·valua: 0,0119 
p·value: 0,2352 
p·value: 0.4093 
p·value: 0,1450 
p·value: 0,3139 
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No. of employees [TAM1]
 
Variable Net Worth Short Term Debt long Term Debt
 
N° 01 F10 F9 F1 F2 F4 F6 F3 F5 F7 F8 F11 
employes 
1· 10 27.51 4.70 17.49 12.28 0.00 6.19 12.29 0.0 10.48 7.14 1.92 
11·49 33.83 2.30 22.79 12.24 0.13 6.49 6.93 0.0 8.01 5.49 1.80 
50·250 31.85 1.30 20.14 14.78 1.80 6.19 11.93 0.0 4.90 4.29 2.83 
F-statistic 0.95 2.36 1.08 0.25 2.82 0.01 1.78 0.0 1.32 0.40 0.23 
p·value 0.39 0.09 0.34 0.78 0.06 0.99 0.17 1.0 0.27 0.67 0.79 
Years in main activity [EDAD1] 
1· 5 31.56 4.28 20.06 6.03 0.00 5.89 14.82 0.0 10.07 3.48 3.81 
6 ·15 29.32 4.06 16.80 12.92 0.08 7.93 11.98 0.0 7.12 7.48 2.30 
16·30 29.83 1.40 22.78 14.49 0.17 4.75 7.02 0.0 11.68 7.09 1.30 
+ 30	 5.22 22.10 14.06 1.31 5.46 6.44 0.0 5.40 3.41 0.9935.62 
F-statistic 0.42 1.10 0.75 1.60 1.11 0.79 1.82 0.0 1.35 0.84 1.07 
p-value 0.74 0.35 0.52 0.19 0.35 0.49 0.15 1.0 0.26 0.47 0.37 
Short Term Debt:	 Fl: Suppliers
 
F2: Domestic Banks S/T
 
F4: Foreign Banks S/T
 
F6: Savings Banks S/T
 
Long Term Debt:	 F3: Domestic Banks LIT
 
F5: Foreign Banks LIT
 
F7: Savings Banks LlP
 
FB: Leasing arrangements
 
F9: Family Loans
 
Net Worth: Fl0: Own resources 
Fll: Others 
Table 2: Sources of Financing 
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No. 01 employees length 01 relationship with main credit entity [AR1] 
[TAM1] 
less than 1 year Between 1 and 2 Between 3 and 5 Between 6 and 10 Over 10 years 
years years years 
1·10 3 12 21 22 18
 
11·49 3 7 13 20 29
 
50 ·250 O O 5 6 16
 
Years in main activity [EDAD1]
 
1· 5 2 10 12 3 2
 
6·15 2 3 16 26 16
 
16·30 O 4 10 10 23
 
+ 30 2 2 2 9 22 
Table 3: Length of relationship with primary credit entity 
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No. of Employees ITAM11 
Variable No. of Financial Entities with which the firm works Maximum debt maintained with a financial entity 
[EFl [OMXI 
Aver Min. Max. O.T Ave. Min. Max O.T 
1 . 10 29 1 10 1.48 62.3 0.0 100 32.7 
11· 49 4.5 1 13 2.26 43.8 0.0 100 27.2 
50·250 6.2 1 14 3.37 45.5 5.0 100 28.8 
f.statistic: 28.371 6.3156 
p·value: 0.000 0.0024 
Sales Volume ITAM21 
O. 30.000 0·25 3.1 1 10 2.1 54.4 0.0 100 7.0 
30.001·106.000 25·50 3.2 1 13 1.8 56.7 0.0 100 5.4 
106.001·313.389 50·75 4.4 1 10 1.9 49.0 0.0 100 4.4 
75·100 5.5 1 14 3.1 44.8 0.0 100 4.6 
f.statistic: 11.4574 1.0934 
p·value: 0.0000 0.3542 
N° of years in the main activity [EDAD1) 
1 . 5 2.9 1 7 1.4 54.8 0.0 100 30.9 
6·15 3.9 1 10 2.1 53.0 0.0 100 29.67 
16·30 4.3 1 13 2.8 52.6 0.0 100 31.66 
+ 30 4.5 1 14 3.0 42.4 0.0 100 33.29 
f.statistic: 2.6902 0.9934 
p·value: 0.0477 0.3980 
Table 4: Financial Entities and maximum percentage of debt. 
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Va/un 
between 0·5 
Diversilication 01 Financial Operations 
by number 01 employees [TAM11 
1.1. 2.1. 1.2. 2.2. 1.3. 2.3. 1.4. 2.4. 1.5. 2.5. 1.6. 2.6. 1.7. 2.7. 
1·10 
11·49 
50 ·250 
1.62 
2.46 
3.11 
1.69 
2.21 
2.42 
0.66 
2.15 
2.60 
0.30 
1.76 
1.73 
0.21 
0.44 
0.56 
0.07 
0.41 
0.54 
0.31 
1.07 
2.19 
0.07 
0.55 
0.73 
1.59 
1.97 
2.15 
0.61 
1.23 
1.65 
0.00 
0.03 
0.04 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.22 
0.17 
0.15 
0.11 
0.07 
0.27 
¡·stalistic 
p·value 
7.53 
0.00 
2.09 
0.12 
15.60. 
00 
17.8 
0.00 
1.83 
0.16 
4.47 
0.01 
17.5 
0.00 
5.47 
0.00 
1.00 
0.37 
6.45 
0.00 
1.19 
0.30 
1.32 
0.26 
0.1 
089 
0.95 
0.38 
Concentration 01 linancial operations 
by number 01 employees [TAM 1] 
Binomial variable: VES ("lo) OPl OP2 OP3 OP4 OP5 
1·10 
11·49 
50 ·250 
24.4 
17.2 
0.00 
35.8 
41.4 
16.7 
62.2 
62.1 
33.3 
35.6 
27.6 
50.0 
4.6 
6.9 
0.0 
1.1. Current Account with Entity 1 
1.2. Discounting 01 bilis Entity 1 
1.3. Savings account with Entity 1 
1.4. Direct payroll deposit with Entity 1 
1.5. Line 01 cred;t with Entity 1 
1.6. Entity's participation in share capital 01 Entity 1. 
1.7. Others: Specily with Entity 1. 
OP1: Cash advances Current Account 
OP2: Descuento de Documentos99 
OP3: Line 01 credit 
OP4: Mortgage Operations 
OP5: Other 
Table 5.1.: Diversification/Concentration of financial operations. 
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Diversification of Financial Operations 
By N" of years since business inilialed in main aClivily EDAD1 1 
1.1. 2.1 1.2 2.2 1.3 2.3 1.4 2.4 1.5. 2.5. 1.6. 2.6. 1.7 2.7 
1· 5 2.86 2.43 1.34 1.00 0.31 0.32 0.97 0.36 1.86 1.00 0.03 0.04 0.34 0.11 
6·15 2.11 2.12 1.54 1.32 0.49 0.37 0.81 0.40 1.86 1.07 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.05 
16·30 1.81 1.72 1.08 0.85 0.23 0.19 0.88 0.30 1.98 1.09 0.02 0.00 0.31 0.19 
+ 30 2.36 1.97 2.18 1.42 0.33 0.25 1.08 0.47 1.72 1.11 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.14 
f·statistic 1.87 0.87 2.55 0.99 0.75 0.42 0.25 0.18 0.19 0.02 0.41 1.15 1.41 0.44 
p· ..lue 0.13 0.45 0.05 0.39 0.51 0.73 0.86 0.90 0.90 0.99 0.74 0.32 0.24 0.72 
Concentration of financial operations 
I 
By no. 01 years since business ¡nil¡aled in main aClivily. [EDAD1] 
Binomial variable: VES (%1 OP1 DP2 OP3 OP4 OP5 
1·5 7.7 30.8 53.9 30.8 7.7 
6·15 25.0 46.4 87.9 25.0 3.6 
16·30 21.7 30.4 60.9 58.5 4.6 I 
+ 30 17.7 29.4 52.9 17.7 5.9 
Table 5.2: Diversification/Concentration of financial operations. 
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-_.__.... _._--------------_._---------------------------------­
No 01 employees [TAM1) Sales Vo/ume [TAM2] Years 01 SME in main activity [EDAD1) 
1·10 1149 50·250 1 2 3 4 0·5 6·15 16·30 +30 
[0·5] 
CAl 3.48 3.67 3.29 3.89 3.59 3.14 3.44 3.76 3.87 3.34 2.68 
CA2 1.57 1.67 1.00 1.26 1.94 1.94 1.48 1.64 1.72 1.08 1.73 
CA3 1.51 1.51 1.76 1.34 2.15 2.15 1.37 1.96 1.87 1.13 1.23 
CM 0.65 0.22 0.71 0.57 0.65 0.65 0.59 0.60 0.43 0.71 0.09 
CA5 1.00 0.49 0.35 0.80 1.44 1.44 0.26 0.44 0.96 0.76 0.41 
CA6 1.59 0.92 1.06 1.3 1.91 1.91 0.93 1.48 1.06 1.53 0.91 
CA7 0.19 0.33 0.47 0.14 0.21 0.21 0.48 0.64 0.36 0.05 0.09 
[0·1] 
Tll 0.72 0.57 0.59 0.77 0.68 0.61 0.54 0.92 0.59 0.57 0.57 
TI2 0.22 0.36 0.35 0.23 0.32 0.28 0.36 0.16 0.35 0.30 0.30 
TI3 0.15 0.11 0.29 0.18 0.24 0.03 0.25 0.20 0.1 O 0.25 0.13 
TI4 0.12 0.21 0.47 0.10 0.21 0.19 0.36 0.08 0.16 0.30 0.26 
TI5 0.37 0.51 0.24 0.28 0.53 0.50 0.36 0.52 0.49 0.28 0.39 
lI6 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 
[%] 
GPl 0.0 11.9 18.4 9.5 11.5 11.1 13.3 12.9 8.8 6.7 17.4 
GP2 40.9 33.3 15.8 14.3 31.5 22.2 20.0 23.7 26.5 33.3 17.4 
GP3 27.3 28.6 34.2 23.8 29.5 26.7 40.0 29.0 20.6 43.3 30.4 
GP4 13.6 7.1 13.2 23.8 13.1 13.3 6.7 15.1 26.5 0.0 8.7 
GP5 9.1 9.5 13.2 4.8 6.6 13.3 13.3 9.7 8.8 10.0 13.0 
GP6 4.5 0.0 2.6 9.5 3.3 2.3 6.7 2.2 0.0 3.3 4.3 
GP7 4.5 9.5 2.6 14.3 4.9 11.1 0.0 7.5 8.8 3.3 8.7 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Table 6.1.: Guarantees requested by financial entity. 
30 
Guarantee wlo collateral guarantee wlcollateral Not indicated by LGA 
guarantee 
NO 9.1% 22.6% 23.6% 
YES 90.9% 77.4% 76.4% 
When? (0·5 ratingl 
CAU1: On the amount 01 the loan. 3.6 3.7 3.4 
CAU2: On the length 01 relationship with lender. 1.4 1.5 1.6 
CAU3: On the leasibility 01 the investment project. 1.5 1.6 1.6 
CAU4: Operations 01 less than 12 months 0.6 0.4 0.5 
CAU5: Operations between 1 and 3 years 1.0 0.8 0.7 
CAU6: Operations 01 over 3 years. 1.9 1.1 1.3 
CAU7: Others 0.5 0.1 0.4 
Rate? (binomial variable) 
TIP1: Personal loan s NOT related to the SAP 0.7 0.6 0.7 
TIP2: Personal related to the SAP 0.1 0.3 0.3 
TIP3: Real NOT related to the SAP 0.3 0.2 0.1 
TIP4: Real related to the SAP 0.3 0.2 0.2 
TIP5: Collateral Guarantee Irom LGA 0.3 0.4 0.4 
TIP6: Other 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Ratio: Loan/ Guarantee(%) 
. 100 22.2% 10.5% 10.7% 
100 11.1% 23.7% 29.3% 
101·200 44.4% 23.7% 30.7% 
201·300 0.0% 15.8% 13.3% 
301400 11.1% 13.2% 8.0% 
401·600 0.0% 5.3% 1.3% 
+ 600 11.1 % 7.9% 6.7% 
total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
WITHOUT Guarentee 
NICC (%): No increase in cost 01 credit. 66.7% 57.8% 67.4% 
SICC ('lo): Yeso there is an ¡ncrease in the cost 01 credit. 33.3% 33.3% 28.1% 
ND (%): Credit not available 0.0% 8.9% 4.5% 
Table 6.2.: Guarantees required by the financial entity 
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Table 7: Regression results for the cost of debt 
varlaD,e "Demc,ent ~Ianaara uev,auon r'SlaUStlC p·value 
" 
11~.u".. 1./44 I"H¿ U.UUU 
D3 2.157 0.784 2.751 0.008 
D4 1.099 0.676 1.627 0.108 
D5 0.008 0.598 0.014 0.989 
D6 0.005 0.540 0.009 0.993 
OSGR ·0.120 0.416 ·0.289 0.773 
DFEll 1.082 0.415 2.608 0.011 
DDP 1.695 0.478 3.544 0.001 
LVT ·0.437 0.150 ·2.911 0.005 
LEO ·0.512 0.224 ·2.287 0.025 
RA 0.017 0.009 1.966 0.053 
luoservallons IU uurom-vvarson .1 ¿u 
R2 O.SOO f-slatistic 6.709 
adjusted R2 0.426 p-value If-statislicl 0.000 
vvnlle s HelerosKeoaslIcllY I eSl 
Obs' R2 14.013 p·value 0.373 
,,; I e s ne erosKeaastlclty I eSl\Wlln crossea termsl 
Obs' R2 54.430 p·value 0.382 
"orma I y es ° ¡ne reslDua s 
Jarque·Bera 0.219 p·value 0.896 
Resulls of the OLS estimation of our regression model ('1 where the dependent variable is the nominal short term interest rate that bear 78 firms under study. e is Ihe constant lerm and 
D3, D4 D5 and D6 are dummy variables corresponding lo Ihe sectors: retail business, wholesale business, construction and services; respectively ·the industrial sector works as a basis· 
. The other dummy variables are: DSGR lit lakes value one when Ihe firms have loan guarantees from a LGAI; DFElllit takes value one when the corresponding survey is received befare 
03/311971. LVT and LEO are sales volume and firm's age in logs, respectively, and RA is the percentage value of the firm's debt with respct to its lotalliabilities. The table includes tesIS 
for heteroskedasticy and normality of the residuals. 
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